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Comment  Arie Kapteyn
It is gratifying to see that economics is catching up quickly with other social 
sciences (particularly sociology and social psychology) by incorporating 
social interactions into models of behavior. One contribution economics 
may make is to bring rigor to the ﬁ  eld and to characterize in particular what 
is and what is not identiﬁ  able in the models that we consider (as in Manski 
[1993]). Smoking is clearly an example where we would expect social inter-
actions to be important, but also one where social interactions are hard to 
distinguish from other reasons for observing clusters of smokers or non-
smokers. The most obvious problem is that smokers (or nonsmokers) may 
ﬂ  ock together. So if we see that smokers often have friends or spouses who 
smoke, this may point to social interactions, but it may also simply indicate 
correlated preferences.
Arie Kapteyn is a senior economist at RAND Labor and Population.142        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
In their chapter, Cutler and Glaeser implement an independent variable 
(IV) strategy, where the existence of workplace smoking bans is used as an 
instrument. They also consider various other pieces of evidence for the exis-
tence of social interactions, to which I will return later.
To set the stage, I ﬁ  nd it useful to write down a simple linear model that 
is akin to theirs, but with slightly more detail. Thus, consider the following 
structure:
(1)  X1   a1   bX2   ε1
  X2   a2   bX1   ε2
Here, X1 and X2 are indicators for smoking by spouses 1 and 2, respectively; 
a1, a2, and b are parameters; ε1 and ε2 are random i.i.d. error terms, with 
variances  2
1 and  2
2 and covariance  12. I will assume that 0   b   1. In prin-
ciple, the parameters a1 and a2 can be made functions of other explanatory 
variables and I will return to that later. For now we note that the system (1) 
implies the following reduced form
(2)  X1   
1
 
1   b2 [a1   a2b   bε2   ε1]
  X2   
1
 
1   b2 [a2   a1b   bε1   ε2].
Thus, if we regress X1 on X2, for instance, then the regression coeﬃcient in 
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And ﬁ  nally, if we assume  12   0 then the regression coeﬃcient is equal to 
2b/ (1    b2), which is the result given in the chapter.
It is easy to see that for  12   0 the regression of X1 on X2 will lead to an 
overestimate of b, no matter if we apply (3), (4), or the result obtained in 
the chapter (i.e., with  12   0). It seems very unlikely that  12 would be nega-
tive. Hence, we would expect a consistent estimation method for b to yield 
a smaller value than ordinary least squares (OLS). Yet the chapter ﬁ  nds the 
opposite: the IV estimate of b is roughly double the OLS estimate.
Cutler and Glaeser oﬀer a number of possible explanations for this ﬁ  nd-
ing. I would like to suggest one additional possibility: assortative mating. 
Suppose that spouses search each other out partly on the basis of smoking 
preferences. This would suggest that an individual who does not smoke may Social Interactions and Smoking    1 4 3
be more likely to select a spouse who is subject to a smoking ban. This, then, 
is likely to introduce a correlation between the smoking ban variable and 
the error term in this individual’s smoking equation and thereby invalidat-
ing this variable as an instrumental variable. This possibility also suggests 
a simple, though perhaps crude, test. Given that the prevalence of smok-
ing bans has increased over time, one would expect the correlation of the 
instrument with the error term to be less for couples who have been together 
longer. The reasoning for this is that for a couple that got married when there 
were no smoking bans, this cannot have aﬀected their marriage decision. If 
this suspicion is correct, the IV estimate of b should be higher for recently 
weds than for couples that married a long time ago. As a ﬁ  rst approximation, 
one can use age as a proxy for the duration of the marriage.
There is a more general question as to why one needs to use the smoking 
ban variable as an instrumental variable at all. Let us consider the IV estima-
tion a little closer. In particular, assume that a1    1    1z1 and a2    2   
 2z2, where z1 and z2 are exogenous variables that can be used as instruments. 
Clearly, 2SLS will yield consistent estimates of the parameters in the model, 
including b. The model used in the chapter includes a large number of con-
trols, which are assumed exogenous, or at least predetermined. In the logic of 
simultaneous equations, all of these can be used as instruments. There does 
not seem to be a need, therefore, to use workplace smoking bans.
An interesting second approach to the analysis of social interactions is 
to consider “social multipliers” and “excess variance” across groups. This is 
easily illustrated in the framework previously introduced. Let us ﬁ  rst con-
sider social multipliers. Suppose that in (1) both a1 and a2 are increased by 
an amount  a. Ignoring social interaction, both X1 and X2 would increase by 
the same amount  a. Taking into account social interactions, that is, using 
(2), we ﬁ  nd that both X1 and X2 increase by  a/ (1  –   b), which is larger. The 
social multiplier is equal to 1/  (1 –   b). Although I illustrate the social multi-
plier in the model for two spouses, the same idea applies to other groups in 
which social interactions may take place, like metropolitan areas or states. It 
is found that the eﬀect of smoking bans on smoking goes up quite strongly 
when moving from individual level data to metropolitan level data and then 
to state level data. Qualitatively similar increases in the social multiplier are 
found for log-  income, but not for years of education. Within the context 
of the model that ﬁ  nding is problematic, since the simple set-  up used in the 
chapter (and in the previous equations) would imply identical social mul-
tipliers for any exogenous variable (any variable on which a1 and a2 would 
depend).
I will also illustrate the notion of excess variance in the context of the 
spouses model. For simplicity, consider the case  2
1    2
2    2. We then have 
for b   0 that the conditional variance of “mean smoking” in the household 
is equal to144        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
(5) Var
X1   X2  
2




{ 2    12}.
For 0   b   1 we have that
(6) Var
X1   X2  
2
 | a1, a2   
1
  
2(1   b)2{ 2    12},
which is clearly larger. Again, the same idea can be applied to larger groups 
than just couples. The data suggest a substantial amount of excess variance. 
It would have been interesting to see the same idea applied to couples, as in 
this example. The formulas also suggest a cautionary note (acknowledged 
in the chapter): if one were to incorrectly assume that the errors are uncor-
related then the presence of  12 in (5) would suggest excess variance, where 
only correlated eﬀects are to blame for the larger than expected variance.
A ﬁ  nal exercise in the chapter involves a simple dynamic model of adop-
tion of smoking and nonsmoking. It turns out that the dynamic model pro-
vides a poor ﬁ  t of the aggregate data. It is not clear why that is, and I would 
hesitate at this moment to take that as evidence against social interactions.
So where does this leave us? The chapter presents an elegant framework 
suggesting various patterns in the data if social interactions are present. 
By and large, the predicted patterns are indeed found in the data and I am 
inclined to interpret this as solid evidence of social interactions in smoking. 
One might argue that social interactions in smoking are so obvious, that 
empirical evidence to support it is hardly necessary. Apart from the obvious 
rejoinder that obtaining a quantitative estimate of the extent of interactions 
in smoking is important by itself, perhaps the most important contribution 
of the chapter is to show how the analytic framework used helps to interpret 
and understand data. At the same time, the patterns in the data are not all 
consistent with the model predictions. The largest marginal value of future 
work may therefore be found in adaptations of the analytic framework, to 
be able to accommodate richer patterns in the data. The chapter provides 
an excellent illustration of the value of a powerful analytic framework for 
understanding the extent and nature of social interactions.
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